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Abstract:  The extent to which  the quantity and quality of education is capitalized into 
housing prices is a key issue  in understanding  the  relationship between allocation of 
educational resources and the housing market. Using monthly panel data of 52 residential 
areas in Shanghai and employing a natural experiment of designating Shanghai Experimental 
Model Senior High Schools (EMSHS), we find that housing prices in Shanghai have 
capitalized the access to quality schools and other public goods. One quality school per 
square kilometer raises average housing prices by approximately 19%, and one best EMSHS   
per
 square kilometer increases housing prices by 21%. We also match the schools designated 
for EMSHS with schools of similar quality but not designated for EMSHS, and compare 
housing prices in the corresponding areas. We find that the designation increased the housing 
prices, showing that dissemination of information about school quality was significantly 
affected by the designation.   
Keywords: Education, Housing market, Capitalization, Public goods, Natural experiment.   2 
1. Introduction 
The extent to which the access to quality education is capitalized into housing prices is a 
cornerstone in modern economic theory of educational resource allocation. However, when 
the correlation between educational quality and housing prices is observed, the causal effect 
may be from housing to education because only the rich can afford expensive housing, and 
they,  having  strong preferences for  human capital investment,  are willing to pay for 
high-quality education. Therefore, generally  the capitalization of education is upwardly 
biased in an estimation of the relationship between educational quality and housing prices. 
Education reform and development of housing markets  in China provide a natural 
experiment that traces the causality from education to housing prices. In the Shanghai case, 
50 quality schools were designated as Shanghai Experimental Model Senior High Schools 
(EMSHS) during education reform in 2005 and 2007. Since there was no official disclosure 
of schools’ quality rankings in the past, information regarding school quality is imperfect in 
Shanghai.  The  designation  of  schools for EMSHS,  which  occurred  in  several  waves, 
revealed  the  information  about  the  school quality, and this disclosure might  influence 
housing prices. Since disclosure of this information about school quality was exogenous to 
housing prices before and after the designation, this study employs a natural experiment to 
examine whether the educational quality is reflected in housing prices. Also, whether the 
designation had significant effects on housing prices can provide evidence for imperfect 
information in education market, because had  information been perfect,  the  designation 
would not have significant effects on school choice. 
There have been many studies on how educational quality might be capitalized in housing 
prices. Tiebout (1956) theoretically analyzed how the provision of public goods may be 
capitalized  through  “voting  with  feet”  and intergovernmental competition.  Oates (1969) 
empirically studied the correlation between housing prices  and the level of local public 
expenditures and taxation. But the endogeneity of educational quality and quantity is always 
an obstacle  in empirical studies  identifying  the causal effect from education to housing   3 
prices. A common method of overcoming this problem is using the boundary discontinuity 
design (BDD) that compares neighboring administrative districts with different education 
resources (Black, 1999; Gibbons and Machin, 2003; Bayer and McMillan, 2005; Kane, 
Staiger,  and Reigg, 2005; Gibbons, Machin,  and Silva, 2009).  Our estimation strategy 
involves a natural experiment occasioned during reform of education and development of 
housing markets in China. Along with an estimation of the relationship between educational 
quality and housing prices by using the full sample of monthly panel data of 52 residential 
areas in Shanghai, we estimate the effect of EMSHS designation on housing prices in order 
to alleviate the endogeneity bias. We find that housing prices in Shanghai have capitalized 
the quality and quantity of education and other public goods. One quality school per square 
kilometer raises housing prices by about 19%, and one best EMESHS per square kilometer 
increases housing prices by 21%. We compare schools designated for EMSHS with schools 
of  similar quality but not designated  for  EMSHS, and compare housing prices in  the 
corresponding areas. We find that the designation did increase housing prices, showing that 
market information regarding the quality of schools is imperfect.    We also find that the 
provision of other public goods, like green space and metro stations, are capitalized into 
housing prices. The effect on housing prices by increasing one best EMSHS per square 
kilometer in one residential area is the equivalent to that of increasing green space by 5.4 
hectares, of reducing the distance to the metropolitan center by 4.6 kilometers, or of moving 
6.0 kilometers nearer to the sub-centers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 
3 introduces the background of compulsory education  reform  and housing market 
development in Shanghai. Section 4 reports data and econometric specifications. Section 5 
reports empirical results.  Section 6 reports several robustness checks.  The last section 
concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
The relationship between local provision of public goods and housing prices is a classical 
issue in public and urban economics. Tiebout (1956) argued that if households are mobile 
and choose the community that provides local public goods for which they are willing to pay, 
then the local government will provide these local public goods more efficiently. Following 
studies showed that if the theory of Tiebout choice holds, the quality and quantity of local 
public goods, such as education, will be capitalized into housing prices (Oates, 1969; Yinger, 
1982). In the general equilibrium analysis of local public goods and residential choice, the 
variance of preferences will lead to sorting in housing and consumption of public goods. 
When incorporating peer effects into education, parents have greater willingness to pay for 
better neighborhoods and better schools, thus sorting will be enhanced (Epple and Romano, 
1998; Epple and Sieg, 1999; Rothstein, 2006).   
Since Oates (1969) empirically analyzed the  effects of property  taxes and  local  public 
spending on property values, there have been numerous empirical studies on the correlation 
between the provision of public goods and housing prices in the United States and Europe. A 
hedonic price model has been commonly used in the econometric specifications of housing 
price studies, which includes both individual characteristics and location characteristics of 
houses  as explanatory variables  (Rosen, 1974; Anderson, 1985; Epple, 1987).  Empirical 
results have been ambiguous, but it has been generally observed that differences in public 
goods, such as education, among local administrative districts are capitalized into housing 
prices. This result implies that Tiebout choice definitely exists in developed housing markets 
(Rubinfield, 1987; Rubinfield, Shapiro and Roberts, 1987; Epple and Sieg, 1999). 
However, the endogeneity problems of missing variable bias and two-way causality may 
exist in early empirical studies on the education–housing price relationship. Unobservable 
neighborhood attributes  and housing characteristics may affect both local  education and 
housing prices. Besides, availability of quality schools may be a function of housing prices 
because people who can afford more expensive homes are more likely to afford good   5 
education for their children. To control these potential endogeneity biases, Black (1999) used 
data of houses near the borders of neighboring school districts in Massachusetts to compare 
housing prices and school quality on  different sides of the shared  border. The core 
explanatory variable  was  the  school’s  average test score in a statewide assessment,  the 
Massachusetts Educational Assessment Program. Estimated via  a  hedonic price model, 
Black’s  conclusion was that a 5%  increase in elementary school test scores leads to an 
increase in the marginal resident's willingness to pay of approximately 2.1%. Black’s use of 
the BDD method was followed by Gibbons and Machin (2003), Bayer and McMillan (2005), 
Kane, Staiger, and Reigg (2005), and Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2009). 
In this study, we adopt a different method to deal with the endogeneity problem. We use 
panel data of 52 residential areas in Shanghai, the commercial center of mainland China, 
spanning  48 months, and utilize  a  natural experiment.  During the education reform  in 
Shanghai, 50 quality schools were designated as Shanghai Experimental Model Senior High 
Schools (EMSHS). The designation was related  only  to school quality, thus it offered a 
natural experiment for investigating whether information  about  quality  schools  affects 
housing prices.  Our approach parallels  that of Figlio and Lucas (2004), who compared 
housing prices before and after the State of Florida began to assign grades to schools based 
on test scores. They found that housing prices increased in areas with higher-graded schools 
compared to areas with lower-graded schools, but the estimated effect diminished over time. 
In  our investigation,  however,  the effect  on housing prices persists  after a school is 
designated  for  EMSHS  .  This  implies  that  information about  school quality  and its 
accessibility influences prices in a developing housing market.   
There are a few empirical studies on the correlation between provision of public goods and 
housing prices in China, but how local education quantity and quality is capitalized into 
housing prices is not well estimated. For example, Wang et al. (2007) found that access to 
subway stations, bus stops, and parks is capitalized into housing prices, but not into land 
prices in Beijing. Zheng and Kahn (2008) used Beijing housing data and found that houses 
closer to high-quality schools had higher prices. However, this study also suffered from   6 
endogeneity. Compared to the existing literature, the natural experiment in this study is more 
efficient in controlling endogeneity when estimating how the quality and quantity of schools 
influence housing prices and how that influence changes over time.   
 
3. Compulsory Education and Housing Markets in Shanghai 
Education reform and housing market development in Shanghai, mainland  China’s most 
populous city and its largest commercial center, comprise a representative case for China. 
Since the 1990s, compulsory education and the housing market in Shanghai have changed 
significantly because of  China’s reform toward a market economy. In  1997,  entrance 
examinations for junior high school were  replaced by the policy  of  “attending nearby 
schools.” This practice is similar to the neighborhood-based school admissions system in the 
United States and some European countries, and it strengthens the relationship between the 
housing market and access to quality education. However, private schools also developed 
rapidly during the early years of China’s education and market reforms. Some primary and 
high schools, usually  the better ones, were partially  privatized.
1
Following reforms that transformed public housing to a private system, Shanghai’s housing 
market  has  grown rapidly in  recent years.  Today housing provisions  are  less  frequently 
included in employee welfare, and therefore an increasing numbers of people buy and sell 
housing in market transactions. The former public housing has been privatized and can also 
be traded in the market. Sato (2006) provided empirical evidence for housing inequality in 
urban China after the reforms in the late 1990s. Development of a housing market enables 
people in effect to choose schools by purchasing an apartment. The rapid increase in housing 
  Several years later, 
following criticism that education reform had created  unequal access to education, most 
partially privatized schools were retransformed to public schools. However, the change of 
ownership structure did not greatly affect schools’ quality and reputation. 
                                                        
1  These schools are called Minban Zhuanzhi Xuexiao (“schools with transformed ownership and run by 
people”). Similarly, private schools are usually called Minban Xuexiao (“schools run by people”).   7 
prices  since 2003 has  provided an opportunity  to study  the capitalization of education 
geographically and chronologically. 
3.1 The “Attending Nearby Schools” System 
The traditional compulsory education system in China was elitist. There were “core” primary 
schools, junior high schools, and senior high schools at different geographical levels. Those 
core schools commanded the best education resources and admitted students on the basis of 
entrance examinations. Enrollment under the “attending nearby schools” system is based on 
parents’ hukou (“household registration”). If parents have not been granted hukou where they 
reside, their children  cannot  attend  nearby  quality public schools, but  can only  attend 
mediocre public schools or private schools. In the early stages of “attending nearby schools” 
reform, private schools and partially privatized schools were allowed to enroll students from 
other districts, and they selected and charged students in several different ways. Former core 
high schools offered “special classes,” “artist classes,” or “experimental classes” to attract 
students who performed well in examinations.
2
After 2003 and the reconsideration of an education system structured as a market, school 
choice has been viewed as hindering equality of educational opportunity. The “attending 
nearby schools” system has been continuously strengthened to promote educational equity. 
Since 2005, academic  competitions  at  the  primary school level, an important tool for 
selecting students based on ability, have been forbidden in every province. Primary schools 
and junior high schools have been disallowed from vying for excellent students. In 2006, the 
Shanghai Municipal Commission  on  Education  (SMCE)  disallowed  public schools  from 
enrolling students on the basis of tests and prohibited private schools from meeting students 
prior to enrollment. In 2007, the Shanghai government further regulated private schools’ 
attempt to enroll students across districts. The policy was interpreted as meaning that private 
schools also would implement the “attending nearby schools” policy. However, although the 
system of “attending nearby schools” has been strengthened, school choice through housing 
   
                                                        
2  Some  of the best Shanghai schools  hold  one-third  of their  enrollment  open  for  specially  selected 
students.   8 
market can not be controlled. In effect, the “attending nearby schools” system means parents 
can choose a school by choosing their residence. Thus, the system has strengthened the 
relationship between housing prices, educational access, and school quality. 
3.2 The History of Shanghai Core High Schools 
Shanghai Core High Schools have a long history. The first were designated in the 1950s, and 
by 2002 there were 33 Shanghai Core High Schools. Under the traditional education system 
in China, these schools enjoyed the best educational resources and enrolled the best students 
through uniform entrance examinations.  Whether  because of teaching quality, school 
facilities, or peer effects among students, the superiority of core high schools was evident in 
their students’ college entrance examinations. Under education reform in the 1990s, the term 
“core junior high schools” was abandoned in pursuit of equal education, but the difference in 
quality among schools never disappeared. The junior sections of core high schools still have 
large advantages over other schools. 
Although enrollment in senior high schools in Shanghai is decided by a city-level uniform 
examination (unlike the “attending nearby school” system for junior high school enrollment), 
before 2005 students were allowed to make only one of the total 16 applications for one of 
the 12 core high schools. Their remaining 15 applications were restricted to schools in their 
own district. Some students moved to other districts before the examination because their 
home location was important when applying for core high schools at that time. 
In recent years, SMCE replaced the term “Shanghai Core High Schools” with “Shanghai 
Experimental Model Senior High Schools” (EMSHS). However, during the period of our 
data set (April 2003 to April 2007), the 33 traditional Shanghai Core High Schools still 
represented the top level of Shanghai senior high school education. Also in 2005, Shanghai 
reformed  the enrollment practices  of  senior high schools. Today, at least  15% of the 
enrollment of every Shanghai Core High School must  be open to students from other 
districts. Today a student can choose one of 50 EMSHS (including the traditional Shanghai   9 
Core High Schools) among his 16 applications. Thus, home location has become a lesser 
factor in senior high school enrollment. However, the enrollment quota for schools in each 
district is still established before examinations, and districts containing a core school have 
more quotas to access that school than other districts. Therefore, parents still have an 
incentive to improve their children’s chances to attend a core high school by purchasing an 
apartment within that school’s district. 
3.3 The Designation of Shanghai Experimental Model Senior High Schools (EMSHS) 
In  February  2005, September 2005,  and July 2007, SMCE designated 50 schools for 
EMSHS  designation in  three  waves. According to SMCE, “the senior high schools and 
senior sections of high schools within Shanghai, after being admitted by the government of 
their own district, can all participate in the public appraisal of EMSHS.”
3
Prices  for existing homes were chosen as samples because China’s market in newly 
constructed housing tends to be more speculative. Thus, data concerning existing homes 
more accurately suggests residential demand for housing. Further, since only housing owners 
may send children to nearby quality public schools, we excluded housing rental data. As we 
  So, after several 
rounds of appraisals and designations, the government gave the market a clear indication of 
which schools were high-quality schools. Although there is no evidence that the designation 
itself  improves  school quality,  it initiates  the  natural experiment to identify whether 
information about school quality influences housing prices.   
4. Data and Econometric Specification 
This study’s empirical analysis answers two questions. First, within Shanghai Municipality, 
do differences in quantity and quality of education influence housing prices? Second, is the 
influence of education on housing prices changing  with the education policies and the 
development of the housing market? 
                                                        
3  “The Ideas of Shanghai Municipal Commission of Education for the Appraisal of Experimental Model 
Senior High Schools,” a document of SMCE.   10 
also noted, people cannot receive hukou by renting an apartment. For these and other reasons, 
apartment  rents  may  not fully capitalize education quality.
4
From publications of the Shanghai Secondhand Housing Price Index Office, we obtained 
monthly data of average prices per square meter for existing houses in 52 residential areas 
within Shanghai from April 2003 to April 2007
  Thus, we focus on housing 
prices instead of housing rents in this empirical study. This may partly explain why housing 
rents are low compared with housing prices in China. Of course, the lack of similar data for 
new housing and rent is another reason to use only existing home prices.   
In addition, we match schools that were included in the first wave of EMSHS designations 
with schools of similar quality but not designated for EMSHS standing in first wave, and we 
compare housing prices of the corresponding areas. If the result is that designation itself 
significantly  affects housing prices, it will also provide evidence that information about 
school quality is imperfect in education market. 
4.1 Data   
The dependent variable is constructed using the data for prices of existing housing. The key 
explanatory variable  is  the quantity of Shanghai Core High Schools, and  Shanghai 
Experimental Model Senior High Schools. Other attributes, including the number of metro 
stations, top level hospitals, and the area devoted to public green space, are matched with the 
data for housing prices and education. Details of data construction are as follows. 
Housing Prices 
5
                                                        
4  But we cannot deny that the quality of schools may be indirectly capitalized into housing rents. 
5  After April 2007, the office released only a monthly city-level aggregate index instead of specific 
prices. 
. Those 52 residential areas are larger than 
school districts but smaller than administrative  districts. They are located in 11 
administrative districts downtown and in suburbs of Shanghai. Each administrative district 
encompasses three to seven residential areas. The scope of a residential area consists of 
several school districts. The boundary difference between one residential area and the extent   11 
of school districts  in the residential  area is minor, because well-known avenues and 
structures are used to define boundaries of residential areas. 
Data used in this study span April 2003 through April 2007, mainly because of availability. It 
is a coincidence that 2003 was the beginning of enhancing “attending nearby schools” policy 
and also marked the onset of rapid growth of housing prices. 
Education   
As suggested in the introductory discussion on education in Shanghai, we used the number 
of Shanghai Core High Schools per square kilometer (denoted as “Core”) to measure the 
quality and quantity of education within each  residential area. To analyze  whether  the 
designation  for  Shanghai Experimental Model Senior High Schools influenced housing 
prices, the education data also include the number of Shanghai Experimental Model Senior 
High Schools per square kilometer (denoted as “EMSHS”). The main sources of data on 
school distribution are the official  website of SMCE and other education websites in 
Shanghai (http://www.shmec.gov.cn; http://www.edu.sh.cn; http://www.shmeea.com.cn). We 
use Shanghai’s map to match data concerning housing prices and education. 
Figure 1 illustrates  the relationship between  housing prices and the number of quality 
schools.  The  slope of fitted lines is always positive, which shows  possible  positive 
correlations between housing prices and the number of quality schools within the residential 
area. 
< Figure 1 about here.> 
Other Public Goods 
Provision of other public goods might influence housing prices. To measure their possible 
influence, we include  hectares of public green space per square kilometer (denoted as 
“Green”), the number of metro stations per square kilometer (denoted as “Metro”), and the   12 
number of top-level  hospitals per square kilometer (denoted as “Hospital”)  within each 
residential area. Data regarding public green space was sourced from the Shanghai Green 
and Urban Amenities website (http://lhsr.sh.gov.cn) and from government websites of related 
districts in Shanghai. Data  regarding  metro stations and hospitals were taken from the 
Shanghai Traffic Map (Shanghai Surveying and Mapping Institute and Chinese Map 
Publishing House, 2004, 2009) and related websites of the Shanghai Municipal Government. 
Distance 
Location is an important  exogenous factor determining housing prices. Our  econometric 
analysis controls two location variables: “Dcenter”—the straight line distance to the People’s 
Square  in  the metropolitan center of Shanghai—and  “Dsub-center”—the  straight  line 
distance to the nearest sub-centers. Before the end of 2007, there were three sub-centers in 
the city-planning of Shanghai: Xujiahui, Wujiaochang, and Pudong Huamu. 
<Table 1 about here.> 
4.2 Econometric Specification 
4.2.1 Panel Data Econometric Model 
Our econometric model to analyze the relationship between housing prices and access to 
quality education is derived from the hedonic housing price model used by Black (1999) and 
Wang  et al.  (2007). Because the  data  we  use  are values  per square kilometer  of each 
residential area, explanatory variables also pertain to the area level. A linear monthly time 
trend is controlled to capture the stable growth of housing prices. Because China’s housing 
market is growing rapidly, the capitalization of education should be considered as a dynamic 
process. Therefore, we control the interaction terms of education and time to examine the 
influence of education on price changes over time. By the same token, the interaction terms 
of other public goods and time are also controlled for. Thus, we get Equation (1) as follows:   13 
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The subscript i in Equation (1) denotes the residential area, and t denotes month within the 
time span April 2003 to April 2007.  it housingprice   denotes housing prices per square meter 
of area i in month t. We use the natural logarithm of housing prices as the dependent variable. 
i distance   represents a vector of the distance to the metropolitan center (Dcenter) and the 
distance to the nearest sub-centers  (Dsub-center).  it education   denotes the number  of 
high-quality schools in area i, which is the key explanatory variable in the analysis.  it public  
is the provision of other public goods, including green space, metro stations, and hospitals. 
time  denotes the monthly time trend variable. The initial month, April 2003, is denoted as 1, 
and increased by 1 at one-month intervals. Since there was a definite change in the rate of 
increase in housing prices around May 2005 (as shown in Figure 2), we divide the variable 
time  into two parts: 
    time1 = (1 − D200505) × time                                           （2） 
time2 = D200505 × time                                                 （3） 
D200505 is a dummy variable, denoted as 1 for periods after May 2005, and otherwise 
denoted as 0. The interaction terms between this time variable and other variables are mostly 
significant in the results reported, indicating that  the turning point of housing prices  is 
statistically significant. 
< Figure 2 about here.> 
The interaction terms between time and education and other public goods are controlled in 
the model.
6
it control     includes other control variables. In particular, we add the interaction 
                                                        
6  If we control time squares  and the interaction terms between that and other explanatory variables, 
almost all the coefficients of these terms are insignificant. The significance of other variables’ coefficients   14 
terms of metro and distance variables to the model. We assume that in areas far from the 
metropolitan center  and  sub-centers, the effects of metro stations of  improving  traffic 
convenience dominate,  which is  positive  for  housing prices;  however,  in areas near the 
metropolitan center or sub-centers, the convenience of nearby metro stations is not important, 
yet congestion effects might dominate when metro stations concentrate in a small area. To 
model the nonlinear effect of metro stations, we control the interaction terms between Metro 
and Dcenter and between Metro and Dsub-center in the model.  i α   denotes unobservable 
residential area attributes, including geographic characteristics, the city-planning of streets 
and buildings, and similar attributes.  it ε   denotes the random error term. 
To control the influence of unobservable factors, we use the following two models based on 
different assumptions. The first is a fixed-effects (FE) model. After within-group de-mean 
transformation, the fixed effect,  i α , is eliminated. We then performed OLS estimation. The 
second  model  is  a  random effects (RE)  model. We assume  i α   is  not correlated to 
explanatory variables, then estimate the model by generalized least squares. The Hausman 
test is used to discriminate the two alternative assumptions. 
4.2.2 The Designation of Shanghai Experimental Model Senior High Schools 
The designation of a school as a Shanghai Experimental Model Senior High School is related 
to its quality and is not influenced by housing prices. Therefore, a reverse causal effect from 
housing prices to school quality can be eliminated.  To analyze whether the designation 
influenced housing prices, we substitute Core and its interaction term with EMSHS and its 
interaction term with time on the base of Equation (1). Because those high-quality schools 
had existed before being  designated as  EMSHS, the term  “EMSHS”  in  the  regression 
denotes  only  the number of schools designated for EMSHS standing.  The time of 
designation  and the number  of  schools  designated  in  each wave are denoted by terms 
“Designation1” (the number of first-wave EMSHS per square kilometer) and “Designation2” 
                                                                                                                                                                           
are also influenced.     15 
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Further, we match the schools designated for first-wave EMSHS standing with the schools of 
similar quality that were  not  designated, and we  compare housing prices in  the 
corresponding areas. By this method, we get Equation (4) as follows: 
 
                                                              ——（4） 
The estimation of Equation (4) is based on sub-samples of four residential areas. Two had 
former core high schools that were not included in the first wave of EMSHS designations in 
February 2005. The other 2 residential areas  had  schools with similar  quality but were 
designated in the first wave. There has been no official disclosure of school quality rankings 
in Shanghai. However, informal quality rankings for guiding school choice in Shanghai are 
available on the Internet. We are unable to confirm whether each informal ranking is exact, 
but we find that two of the first-wave EMSHS are always ranked lower in different rankings. 
We then match those two schools with the former core high schools that were not included in 
the first wave of EMSHS designations. The variable “EMSHS1L” denotes the number of 
schools with similar quality but designated as first-wave EMSHS per square kilometer in 
each residential area. “D200502” is a dummy variable valued at 1 for periods after February 
2005  and  0  otherwise. The coefficient of the interaction term between EMSHS1L  and 
D200502 is the estimation of the effect on housing prices of schools in a residential area 
being included in the first wave of EMSHS designations. 
 
 
                                                        
7  The third wave of designations occurred outside our data period and is not considered in the analysis.   16 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the results of Equation (1) for the panel data of 52 residential areas. Column 
(1) shows the result of FE estimation, and Column (2) shows the result of RE estimation. 
The Hausman test statistic is 48.59, with p value 0.000. Because the null hypothesis of the 
Hauman test is that there are no systematic differences between FE and RE results, the test 
result implies that FE estimation should be the final result. In fact, the difference between the 
results in Columns (1) and (2) is only that of the magnitude of the coefficients, but the sign 
and significance are mostly consistent. 
<Table 2 about here.> 
The results presented in Table 2 show that Core is significantly positive, and its interaction 
term with both time1 and time2 are negative but not significant. When an area has one 
additional quality school per square kilometer, housing prices will be approximately 19.2% 
higher. By comparing explanatory variables, we observe that the effect on housing prices by 
increasing one Shanghai Core High School per square kilometer in one residential area is 
equivalent to that of enlarging green space by 4.2 hectares, of moving 5.1 kilometers nearer 
to the metropolitan center, or of  moving  6.7  kilometers nearer to the sub-centers.  Most 
Shanghai Core High Schools have existed for several decades or longer. Their influence was 
long ago incorporated into housing prices. 
Table 2 demonstrates that the provision of other public goods also is capitalized into housing 
prices. The coefficient of Green is significantly positive. Housing prices are approximately 
4.54% higher in areas that have one more hectare of green space per square kilometer. The 
coefficient of Metro is significantly negative, and its interaction term with Dcenter is not 
significant, while its interaction term with Dsub-center is significantly positive. At about 7.4 
kilometers from the sub-centers, the effects of metro stations on housing prices turn from 
negative to positive. The result is consistent with the finding in Gu and Zheng (2009) about 
the influence of Beijing’s No. 13 metro line on nearby housing prices. They find that in   17 
suburban areas housing prices within 1 kilometer of railway stations are nearly 20% higher 
than those beyond that distance, but the effect is not significant in downtown areas. The 
possible explanation is that transportation is already convenient in central metropolitan areas, 
where the influence of metro stations is mainly  negative  on  housing prices  because of 
congestion. But at some distance from the metropolitan center  or  sub-centers, traffic 
convenience becomes the major contribution of metro stations, which is positive on housing 
prices. Further, in a multi-center city like Shanghai the positive effects mainly depend on the 
distance to sub-centers.   
The coefficient of “Hospital” and its interaction term with time are not significant, possibly 
because access to hospitals has two different effects simultaneously: getting to a hospital is 
more convenient (positive effect on housing prices) but environmental effects are negative 
(negative effect on housing prices). On average, those effects negate each other.   
Moreover, the coefficients of Dcenter and Dsub-center  are significantly  negative. 
Considering Shanghai’s spatial economic structure wherein economic activities concentrated 
in  the  center and sub-centers  of  the city, the result that housing prices (land rents) are 
determined by job location and traffic cost  is consistent with the theoretical  models of 
Alonso (1964) and Zenou (2008). It is also consistent with Hao and Chen’s (2007) empirical 
findings of how location influences housing prices for 106 blocks within Shanghai. 
Table 3 reports the influence of EMSHS designation on housing prices. Column (3) in the 
table is the FE result, and Column (4) is the RE result. The Hausman test is 40.28 with p 
value 0.0007, rejecting the null hypothesis of no significant difference between the FE and 
RE results. Thus, our discussion is based on FE results.   
<Table 3 about here.> 
First, the coefficient of EMSHS is significantly positive, and its interaction terms with time1 
and time2 are significantly negative.  These  results  imply  that EMSHS as high-quality 
schools decidedly influence housing prices, and the influence was already present earlier.   18 
The negative interaction terms are probably due to the 2005 enrollment reform that relaxed 
EMSHS restrictions on enrolling students from other districts. Second, the coefficients of 
Designation1 and Designation2 are significantly positive, and the value of first coefficient is 
2.4 times greater than that of the second. In the last period within the data set (April 2007), 
when a residential area has one more first-wave EMSHS per square kilometer, housing 
prices are approximately 21.7% higher. This increase is equivalent to the effect of increasing 
green space by 5.4 hectares, of moving 4.6 kilometers toward the metropolitan center, or of 
moving 6.0 kilometers nearer to the sub-centers. The results imply that the designation of 
EMSHS discloses  information  about  school quality, and  it  definitely  influences  housing 
prices. 
Further, because the different waves of designation resulted from competition among many 
schools, schools included in the first wave of EMSHS designations were well-known schools. 
All 28 schools designated in the first wave had been Shanghai Core High Schools, while 
only three of 11 schools in the second wave had been core schools. The information from the 
first wave of designations had been capitalized into housing prices. In comparing the effects 
of Core on housing prices in Table 2, we observe that the first wave of EMSHS designations 
had a greater influence on housing prices. This is understandable, because the estimation in 
Table 2 is an average effect of core schools, while the first-wave designated EMSHS were 
the best among core schools. Moreover, the sign and significance of other variables in Table 
3 are consistent with those in Table 2. 
Finally, Table 4 shows the results of estimation on first wave EMSHS  designation. The 
coefficient of EMSHS1L is not significant, which implies that the effects of those sample 
schools on  housing prices were nearly the same at the beginning. This  interpretation is 
reasonable  because  we matched  schools  of  similar quality according to informal school 
quality rankings. The interaction term between EMSHS1L and D200502 is significantly 
positive, implying that the information of EMSHS designation has been capitalized into 
housing prices. The value is 0.0612, a much lower estimate compared with the effect of 
designation in the previous estimation. This is understandable, as we did not control for   19 
quality variances among  schools  designated in the first-wave,  whereas  this calculation 
compares the effects of designated and non-designated schools of similar quality. However, 
we still base our evaluation of the effect of school quality on housing prices on the previous 
estimation in Table 3, because the real effect of designation should be expressed as the 
average effect of designating schools of different qualities. 
<Table 4 about here.> 
6. Robustness Check 
Table 5 reports the results of several robustness checks performed on the estimation. First, 
Pudong District is separated by the Huangpu River from the metropolitan center; therefore, a 
straight-line measurement of distance to the center underestimates the real distance. Pudong 
began  its  speedy  development in the early 1990s, and the history of its  educational 
development  might  not  be  comparable to other districts. Therefore, we  performed  a 
robustness check in Columns (6) and (7) using sub-samples without Pudong, and observed 
that the signs and significance of variables are almost the same as Table 2. We performed 
another robustness check by considering  the sub-samples of residential areas near the 
metropolitan center alone. By estimating the sub-samples of 34 residential areas within eight 
kilometers of the metropolitan center in Columns (8) and (9), we found no change in signs 
and significance of main variables. Finally,    Columns (10) and (11) show the results of 
estimation without interaction terms to test whether our results for education–housing price 
relationship are robust under different functional forms. The effects of Shanghai Core High 
Schools and of the designation in the first wave of EMSHS remain significant. 
<Table 5 about here.> 
7. Conclusions 
Endogeneity of education quality and quantity causes difficulties in identifying the causal   20 
relationship between education and housing prices. To determine how significantly education 
quality has been capitalized into housing prices, we utilized a natural experiment occasioned 
during China’s education reform to deal with the endogeneity bias. On the basis of the 
exogenous natural experiment of EMSHS designation, we observed that housing prices in 
Shanghai have capitalized the quality and quantity of education along with other public 
goods. One quality school per square kilometer raises housing prices by approximately 19%, 
and one best EMESHS per square kilometer increases housing prices by 21%. The effect on 
housing prices by increasing one best EMSHS per square kilometer in one residential area is 
the equivalent to that of increasing green space by 5.4 hectares, of reducing the distance to 
the metropolitan center by 4.6  kilometers, or of  moving 6.0 kilometers nearer to the 
sub-centers. The capitalization changes over time when schools are allowed to or restricted 
from enrolling students from other districts. Restricting enrollment across districts enhances 
the relationship between school quality and housing prices, while deregulation weakens the 
relationship. The capitalization of other public goods such as public green space and metro 
stations also appears in the Shanghai data. The positive effects of metro station are found 
only in locations more than seven or eight kilometers distant from the sub-centers. Because 
the exogenous natural experiment has efficiently eliminated the influence of endogeneity, 
our finding that educational quality is capitalized in housing prices is a convincing empirical 
evidence. Also, the finding that EMSHS designation itself has significant effects on housing 
prices provides evidence that information regarding school quality is imperfect in Shanghai’s 
developing education and housing market. 
Our empirical findings present important evidence of Tiebout choice occurring in China’s 
metropolitan housing market, which is a key mechanism in making education policy. When 
education resources are allocated through the housing market, the regulations for seemingly 
equalized educational access, for instance, regulating school choice and school choice fees, 
may enhance the  education–housing price relationship, making  people compete for 
educational resources through housing choices and widening the inequality of educational 
access. 
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Table 1: Statistical Summary of Variables 




Min.  Max. 
Explained variable (unit: RMB/m
2) 
it housingprice   2496  7993.11   1950.46   3514.00   13229.00  
 
Explanatory variables 
(1)  it education   (unit: number/km
2) 
Core  2496  0.09   0.16   0.00   0.77  
EMSHS  2496  0.15  0.26  0.00  1.54 
(2) it public   (unit: number/km
2) 
Green (hectares)  2496  2.45   3.36   0.00   15.90  
Metro (number)  2496  0.21   0.27   0.00   0.89  
Hospital (number)  2496  0.15   0.35   0.00   2.31  
(3) i distance   (unit: km) 
Dcenter  52  6.80   3.57   0.00   14.50  
Dsub-center  52  4.99   2.29   0.00   12.00  
           
Area (unit: km
2)  52  10.51  12.15  1.3  75 
   24 
 
 
Table 2: Regression of Housing Prices on Explanatory Variables 
  (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable:  ln( ) it housingprice  




  (0.0829)  (0.0679) 
Core × time1  −0.00359  −0.00320 
  (0.00247)  (0.00249) 
Core × time2  −0.00153  −0.00164 




  (0.00904)  (0.00341) 
Green × time1  −0.0000316  −0.0000335 
  (0.0000891)  (0.0000899) 
Green × time2  −0.0000696
*  −0.0000633 




  (0.112)  (0.0893) 
Metro × time1  −0.000740  −0.00118 
  (0.00130)  (0.00130) 
Metro × time2  0.0000928  −0.000387 
  (0.000574)  (0.000571) 
Metro × Dcenter  0.00196  −0.00418 
  (0.0113)  (0.00962) 
Metro × Dsub-center  0.0655
***  0.0189 
  (0.0146)  (0.0116) 
Hospital    0.0224 
    (0.0432) 
Hospital × time1  0.00158  0.00142 
  (0.00117)  (0.00118) 
Hospital × time2  0.000752  0.000778 








  (0.000199)  (0.000194) 
Dcenter    −0.0321
*** 
    (0.00389) 
Dsub-center    −0.0244
*** 




  (0.0235)  (0.0374) 
Observations  2496  2496 
R
2 (within groups)  0.829  0.827 
Notes: 
(1) Standard error in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Influence of “Shanghai Experimental Model Senior High Schools” Designation 
on Housing Prices 
  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable:  ln( ) it housingprice  




  (0.0790)  (0.0546) 
EMSHS × time1  −0.00552
***  −0.00519
*** 
  (0.00167)  (0.00168) 
EMSHS × time2  −0.00690
***  −0.00669
*** 












  (0.00883)  (0.00342) 
Green × time1  −0.0000581  −0.0000588 
  (0.0000870)  (0.0000877) 
Green × time2  −0.0000854
**  −0.0000824
** 
  (0.0000380)  (0.0000382) 
Metro  −0.331
***  −0.0518 
  (0.112)  (0.0900) 
Metro × time1  −0.00127  −0.00164 
  (0.00126)  (0.00127) 
Metro × time2  −0.000170  −0.000597 
  (0.000560)  (0.000556) 
Metro × Dcenter  −0.00734  −0.0104 
  (0.0111)  (0.00956) 
Metro × Dsub-center  0.0488
***  0.00723 
  (0.0147)  (0.0117) 
Hospital    0.00395 
    (0.0488) 
Hospital × time1  0.00173  0.00147 
  (0.00129)  (0.00130) 
Hospital × time2  0.000424  0.000292 




  (0.000433)  (0.000431) 
time2  0.0135
***  0.0137
***   27 
  (0.000197)  (0.000193) 
Dcenter    −0.0315
*** 
    (0.00397) 
Dsub-center    −0.0240
*** 




  (0.0250)  (0.0382) 
Observations  2496  2496 
R
2 (within groups)  0.837  0.836 
Notes: 
(1) Standard error in parentheses. 























Table 4: Effects of First-wave “Shanghai Experimental Model Senior High Schools” 
Designation 
  (5) 
Dependent variable:  ln( ) it housingprice  
lnhp 
EMSHS1L  −0.0774 
  (0.0497) 
D200502  0.206*** 
  (0.0200) 
EMSHS1L × D200502  0.0612*** 
  (0.0183) 
Green  0.0280 
  (0.0259) 
Metro  −0.130** 
  (0.0501) 
time1  0.0109*** 
  (0.000902) 
time2  0.00556*** 
  (0.000650) 
Distance1  −0.0167 
  (0.0272) 
Distance2  −0.0569*** 
  (0.00921) 
Constant  9.075*** 
  (0.186) 
Observations  192 
R
2  0.946 
Notes: 
(1) Standard error in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Dependent variable: 
ln( ) it housingprice  
FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE 
Core  0.204**    0.139*    0.128*   
  (0.0852)    (0.0840)    (0.0741)   
Core × time1  −0.00323    −0.00343       
  (0.00256)    (0.00265)       
Core × time2  −0.00178    −0.00147       
  (0.00114)    (0.00120)       
EMSHS    0.223***    0.134*    0.159** 
    (0.0810)    (0.0797)    (0.0734) 
EMSHS × time1    −0.00540***    −0.00434**     
    (0.00173)    (0.00171)     
EMSHS × time2    −0.00699***    −0.00495***     
    (0.00104)    (0.00103)     
Designation1    0.338***    0.265***    0.180*** 
    (0.0325)    (0.0329)    (0.0208) 
Designation2    0.149***    0.0865**    −0.0582*** 
    (0.0342)    (0.0337)    (0.0199) 
Green  0.0429***  0.0417***  0.0383***  0.0402***  0.0446***  0.0466*** 
  (0.00939)  (0.00917)  (0.0104)  (0.0102)  (0.00881)  (0.00869) 
Green × time1  −0.000108  −0.000154  −9.21e-05  −0.000135     
  (0.000111)  (0.000108)  (0.000120)  (0.000117)     
Green × time2  −6.04e-05  −9.01e-05*  −0.000141***  −0.000171***     
  (4.86e-05)  (4.74e-05)  (5.25e-05)  (5.14e-05)     
Metro  −0.414***  −0.266**  −0.906***  −0.887***  −0.122***  −0.118*** 
  (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.253)  (0.248)  (0.0228)  (0.0225) 
Metro × time1  −0.00113  −0.00174  −0.000112  −0.000680     
  (0.00135)  (0.00132)  (0.00144)  (0.00142)     
Metro × time2  −0.000183  −0.000510  0.000354  1.17e-05     
  (0.000602)  (0.000589)  (0.000651)  (0.000645)     
Metro × Dcenter  −0.00634  −0.0166  0.0510*  0.0562**     
  (0.0119)  (0.0117)  (0.0275)  (0.0270)     
Metro × Dsub-center  0.0628***  0.0480***  0.101***  0.0968***     
  (0.0149)  (0.0150)  (0.0258)  (0.0254)     
Hospital × time1  0.00133  0.00159  0.00158  0.00155     
  (0.00121)  (0.00134)  (0.00120)  (0.00130)     
Hospital × time2  0.000626  0.000356  0.000648  0.000275       30 
  (0.000526)  (0.000587)  (0.000529)  (0.000576)     
time1  0.0175***  0.0177***  0.0169***  0.0171***  0.0167***  0.0164*** 
  (0.000499)  (0.000497)  (0.000562)  (0.000571)  (0.000304)  (0.000301) 
time2  0.0138***  0.0139***  0.0137***  0.0138***  0.0133***  0.0129*** 
  (0.000230)  (0.000229)  (0.000261)  (0.000266)  (0.000139)  (0.000146) 
Constant  8.541***  8.522***  8.659***  8.640***  8.511***  8.495*** 
  (0.0240)  (0.0259)  (0.0296)  (0.0326)  (0.0225)  (0.0239) 
Observations  2160  2160  1632  1632  2496  2496 
R
2  0.829  0.837  0.836  0.843  0.827  0.832 
Notes: 
(1) Standard error in parentheses. 
(2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
(3) Columns (6) and (7) are based on sub-samples excluding Pudong. Columns (8) and (9) are based on 
sub-samples of 34 residential areas within 8 kilometers from the metropolitan center. Columns (10) and 

















Figure 1: Correlation between Housing Prices and Quantity of Private and Partially-privatized 
Junior High Schools 
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